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This article engages specifically with the local turn in UN peace operations by looking at local 
engagement and empowerment in the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire. After the closure of a 
long-serving UN peace operation it is important to take stock of the activities pursued under 
the mandate and reflect on how the mission has contributed to peacekeeping practice. UN peace 
operations have increasingly undertaken peacebuilding activities at the local level with current 
literature emphasising the need to involve local actors in decision-making and reconciliation 
activities. In seeking to uncover how the UN understands the need to involve local actors, the 
mission activities of UNOCI are broken down into a number of themes looking at how the local 
are engaged, given agency and empowered, and also where the UN recognises specific 
vulnerabilities of persons. The article shows how the UN portrays its activities and where it has 
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1 Introduction  
 
In recent years there has been a deluge of literature advocating bottom-up local engagement, 
and ultimately ownership, to ensure the dividends of peacebuilding reach those affected by 
conflict. This is in contrast with the previously dominant promotion of the liberal peace as a 
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top-down hegemonic project from the global North. However, it is not always clear in mandates 
and UN reporting where the local have been engaged or given agency. For instance, there are 
not typically section headings in the Secretary-General’s periodic reports on particular UN 
peace operations detailing where the mission has sought to engage the local. It can then appear 
to a casual reader that the UN does not have much of a concern for the local. Particularly for 
future peacekeeping practice, the UN needs to be aware of ways in which relationships with 
local actors can be nurtured and promoted. 
This article breaks down the UN documentation and shows where the UN have in fact 
sought to engage the local and reported the activity. As a long-deployed UN peace operation, 
the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) spanned several developments in UN 
peacekeeping across the so-called third generation of missions. Multidimensional operations 
with large peacebuilding components and protection of civilian mandates under Chapter VII 
became the norm during UNOCI’s deployment. Other studies have examined, for instance, the 
effectiveness of UNOCI, the implications of the certification of the 2010 election results by the 
UN, the interplay between the local and international actors in the Ivorian conflict, the legality 
of regime change in Côte d’Ivoire, and the continuing role of elites in the peacebuilding 
process.1 This study’s contribution is a view on how the UN itself has framed its various 
activities in Côte d’Ivoire and specifically how the UN portrayed its peacebuilding activities in 
Secretary-General reporting and other UN documentation. The purpose is to shed light on how 
mission activities are reported by the UN and draw out trends that can inform the planning of 
future peacebuilding activities. Although examples are found of where the UN reports on local-
level engagement, empowerment and identification of vulnerabilities, whether local voices 
impact the decision-making of the UN is not regularly reported. It is suggested the UN can 
incentivise local actors to work closely with the mission by more clearly demonstrating how 
local voices can be impactful at the Secretariat and in the Security Council. 
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By taking UNOCI as a case study the mission is discussed in relation to the local turn 
and uses UN public documentation from the mission’s inception to its closure in 2017. First, a 
discussion of the local turn places this study within the current literature by outlining how the 
local has become an important consideration for the UN. Second, examples are given of where 
the local have been engaged, where they have been given agency and empowered, and where 
vulnerabilities have been identified. What the article does not do is aim to provide an expansive 
critique of the UN’s approach to the local, although some thoughts are offered. Nor does the 
article give express views on how best to engage the local. Instead the article clarifies how the 
UN has portrayed its approach to engaging the local over the course of UNOCI’s deployment 
to highlight various best practices and areas for improvement both in the activities themselves 
and the UN’s reporting. By providing this perspective the article aims to assist future research 
in both the UN’s relationship with Côte d’Ivoire and wider UN peacekeeping practice. 
The case study is useful from a temporal point of view due to UNOCI’s long period of 
deployment from 2004-2017. As will be discussed in the first section, the local turn has largely 
come to pass after the UN experiences in Kosovo and East Timor and the international 
community’s endeavours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although it must be said that the local turn 
has existed in academic literature for much longer. What can be seen in the case study below 
is a gradual shift of the mission toward a conscious effort to pursue local engagement in the 
second half of the mission following the 2010 elections. Initially deployed in 2004, the mission 
mandate did not include any express objectives to pursue local engagement.2 Instead the 
mandate focused on monitoring the ceasefire, assisting with the disarmament, the 
demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation programme agreed under the peace agreement, 
the protection of civilians, supporting humanitarian assistance and the peace process, 
investigating human rights violations, using radio to promote an understanding of the peace 
process, and assisting with restoring law and order.3 During the first half of its deployment, 
from 2004 to 2010, UNOCI was faced with a stalled peace process and a five-year delay to the 
holding of elections. During those first years of the mission the case study shows limited 
engagement of the local.  
Elections were not held until October 2010 where the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) declared that Laurent Gbagbo had lost and Alassane Ouattara had become 
the new president. The UN certified the result from the IEC but there were open questions as 
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to the inclusivity of the elections with Bekoe arguing ‘UNOCI undermined its own strategy 
with the overriding objective to hold the elections, even under sub-optimal conditions, as part 
of the exit strategy.’4  In the years that followed Gbagbo’s arrest, UNOCI began to draw down 
its presence in Côte d’Ivoire with ultimate withdrawal and closing of the mission in June 2017. 
In the years following the 2010 elections the mission became more concerned with addressing 
post-conflict threats within communities caused by land disputes and access to natural 
resources.5 In addition, UNOCI undertook a number of initiatives to support peace at the local 
level and national reconciliation and social cohesion became a mission priority.6 As the case 
study will show this change in emphasis provided space for UNOCI to engage and empower 
communities. 
 
2 The local turn 
 
2.1 What is the local turn? 
 
Since the 1990s there has been a growing understanding that there must be an emphasis on 
local actors, communities, and civil society to pursue ‘peace from below’.7 Much of the 
literature derives from a critique of the liberal peace and top-down hegemonic approaches 
where the international community sought to implement various universal goals such as human 
rights norms, the rule of law, and democracy.8 Proponents of the liberal peace argue that under 
a democratic government and with a market economy post-conflict states are able to have 
sustainable peace. This view has been reflected in UN documents such as the UN’s 1992 
Agenda for Peace  where it is stated that ‘[t]here is an obvious connection between democratic 
practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement 
of true peace and security in any new and stable political order.’9 The UN will be discussed in 
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more depth in the following section but it suffices to say here that the UN has and arguably 
continues to work on the assumption that adherence to the goals found in the UN Charter 
necessitate multiple facets of the liberal peace.  
Wallis explains the liberal peace was ‘based on the assumption that liberalism was 
inherently attractive and offered the most likely path to peace and prosperity.’10 In this sense, 
it can be suggested that the liberal peace was seen to be a favourable path due to the prevailing 
international system which comprises norms of sovereignty, universal human rights, and 
peremptory norms against torture, aggression and more. In addition, it has been said liberal 
peacebuilding allows for the emancipation of people with only international organisations and 
sufficiently capable states able to undertake such state (re)building projects under the liberal 
conception.11 Therefore, only the organisations which form part of the prevailing international 
system, and states from the global North which constructed the system, are those able to action 
the liberal peace and convert states which have failed under non-liberal orders. 
 As a top-down intervention, liberal peacebuilding necessarily has a disconnect from 
local people and communities. Under liberal conceptions of peace, it is perceived that the 
imposition of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights will be problematic.12  A top-down 
intervention is aimed at changing the minds of local people in a way that they then wish to 
pursue various liberal agendas. Chandler outlines how this creates a hierarchy of understanding 
where the international community assume they have a superior perspective and local people 
must adopt what is being taught.13 Similarly, Mac Ginty suggests peacebuilding activities can 
reinforce the idea that expertise must come from the outside and that local people ‘are passive 
victims and recipients who lack the agency to chart their own path unaided.’14  
Critiques of liberal peace are largely based on the idea that it is external actors, such as 
international organisations and coalitions of states, who possess the role of peace maker, 
keeper, and broker.15 Therefore, local voices are disempowered and lack a role in the peace 
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process where the post-conflict reconstruction is being conducted by external actors.16 Where 
post-conflict reconstruction is being carried out in a top-down manner Autesserre has identified 
that tenuous casual chains are made by peacebuilders. For instance, an external actor can 
suggest that ‘providing rape victims with sewing machines (or chickens, or the means to set up 
a beauty salon) will help these women gain financial independence, which will in turn give 
them greater political voice, and will thus help end sexual violence.’17 The tenuous casual 
chains are based on assumptions lacking local knowledge, which could provide more effective 
interventions. It is from issues such as this from which the local turn has gained traction. 
What the local turn does is bring to the forefront local perceptions of peace and how 
local people believe sustainable peace can be brought about in their communities.18 The local 
turn is a ‘fundamental challenge’ to how the West/global North thinks about peace.19 The local 
is difficult to define but is seen to be any individual or grouping of persons on the receiving 
end of peacebuilding activities, whether they be military or economic, where local voices are 
unlikely to be heard.20 For the purposes of this article, there are a broad range of local actors at 
the sub-national level whose voices need to be heard by the UN when decisions are made about 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Autesserre provides a useful definition that the local 
includes the individual, family, clan, district, province or ethnic group (where the ethnic group 
is not a national level one).21 
The local turn is premised on the idea that there exists a wealth of detailed knowledge 
at the sub-national level which can be tapped into by external actors. The local are then a 
primary focus for peacebuilders and inform decision-making. Following the discourse, the 
local are part of an ‘emancipatory peace built from below’ that includes legitimate everyday 
activities.22 A detailed literature review from Leonardsson and Rudd charts the scholarship on 
the local turn show that the peace-making potential of the local has been increasingly 
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recognised since the 1990s.23 International organisations and states began to respond to the 
local turn discourse in the 2000s following UN experiments of administration in Kosovo and 
East Timor and poor results of liberal peace interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.24 The 
concept of human security also gained traction in the 1990s and early 2000s recognising that 
the individual must be given intrinsic value and that where the individual’s interests compete 
with that of the state the former should be given priority.25 The human security discourse has 
similarly suggested that local voices are used to determine what is crucially important to people 
in conflict and that people are empowered to ‘avoid some risks and demand improvements in 
the system of protection.’26 In a similar vein, Randazzo says the varying perspectives on the 
local turn have a common understanding that the local be given agency and engaged with to 
uncover realities and concerns that can result in improvements in the intervention undertaken 
by external actors.27 
Schierenbeck explains the local can be ‘navigation points’ and can support 
policymakers and peacebuilders.28 However, the local turn is not only about providing support 
which better informs a liberal peacebuilding intervention. Instead, local turn scholarship has 
focused on ownership and whether local actors are given elements of control of the 
peacebuilding process. This is important because if local actors are included in, and given 
ownership of, peace-building, peace-making and peace-keeping then they are more likely to 
cooperate and perceive an intervention as legitimate.29 It is the idea of ownership that sets the 
local turn on a collision course with the liberal peace.30 Richmond explains that ‘ownership 
indicates choice and flexibility over institutional formats.’31 Ownership means there must be a 
debate in each post-conflict situation as to what constitutes the local and what ownership 
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means, not being predetermined by the liberal peacebuilders launching an intervention.32 An 
intervention implies a denial of local ownership in the short term but ‘local ownership implies 
that actors choose what they own and how they own it, rather than taking possession of what 
is given to them.’ Local ownership then necessitates external actors giving space for the local 
to be engaged and for a relationship to develop where they work in tandem with the 
international community on local priorities. 
There are critiques of the local turn. It is not the purpose of this article to provide an 
exposé of the strengths and pitfalls of a focus on the local, but some examples of critiques will 
briefly be given here for context. For instance, ‘the locals’ are far from being a homogeneous 
and well-defined entity and there are multiple connections that link the different ‘locals’ with 
the global (and national).’33 The local are linked to a ‘web of clientelist networks’ which means 
they are never purely local and tied to national discourses by persons with the necessary 
connections.34 Autesserre’s definition given above will likely have a number of criticisms and 
others have said there is ‘an unmistakeable tendency for vagueness about who or what 
constitutes ‘local’’.35 There may also be situations where the local are given some form of 
ownership at a lower level but are not able to dictate the overall direction of the peacebuilding 
plan.36 This can result in empowered locals still remaining part of a liberal peacebuilding plan 
where token ownership is given with the aim of legitimising Western understandings of 
democracy and the rule of law. Lastly, the local have also been ‘romanticised’ where local 
approaches are seen to be ‘more authentic, natural, and good than international ones.’37 
However, local actors are able to create frameworks and systems that result in impunity, 
injustice and other negative outcomes. 
 
2.2 The UN’s understanding of the local turn 
 
The above section has outlined the local turn and its emergence as a critique of the liberal peace 
and alternative approach to peace-building, peace-making and peace-keeping. What was not 
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discussed is how one of the largest international organisations, which routinely undertakes 
many forms of intervention, perceives the local. Mac Ginty describes the 1992 Agenda for 
Peace as the ‘seminal document in the development of modern peacebuilding’ but states that it 
does not make use of the word ‘local’.38 More recent initiatives and UN documentation do 
prioritise local engagement and ownership. Under the leadership of Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, the UN recognised the need to ‘build local capacities for conflict resolution’ and that 
the UN’s role is to support the creation of conditions under which the local population can 
achieve a sustainable peace.39 Later on in 2008, with regards to civic engagement, the UN 
stated ‘engagement is regarded as an important governance norm that can strengthen the 
decision-making arrangements of the state and produce outcomes that favour the poor and the 
disadvantaged.’40 In this regard it can be seen that the UN appreciates the need to engage with 
a diverse range of actors, some of whom will constitute sections of the local, to achieve 
meaningful improvements. Specifically, with regards to UN peace operations, the High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) recommended in 2015 that,  
‘[e]ngagement must increasingly be regarded as core to mission success. By 
shifting from merely consulting with local people to actively including them 
in their work, missions are able to monitor and respond to how local people 
experience the impact of peace operations. That helps the mission to ensure 
that it does no harm. Ongoing community engagement also helps the mission 
to design better protection strategies to ensure the mission is more effective 
in improving the lives of the people it is deployed to serve and protect.’41 
Ownership has also, on occasion, been mentioned in the UN reporting on its peace operations. 
For instance in one 2015 report on the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) the Secretary-General 
welcomed efforts to contribute to local ownership.42 Similarly, states in the Security Council 
have supported the HIPPO recommendations by expressing support for people-centred 
approaches where local people affected by conflict are able to be engaged and have 
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ownership.43 In a 2016 report on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) the 
Secretary-General demonstrates an understanding that engagement at the national level is 
distinct from engagement at the local level and that local engagement can have ‘positive 
societal implications’.44 
As will be seen in the case study below, the UN does provide space for local 
engagement emphasising the need to address local priorities, promote national reconciliation, 
and ultimately build a sustainable peace. Ownership though is distinct from engagement and 
Billerbeck reports that the UN ‘remain[s] silent on how to build ownership in practice.’45 The 
UN also often conflates local ownership with national ownership.46 For instance, where various 
national civil society groups are given a voice in the peace process the UN will regard this as 
local contribution to national reconciliation. Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Martin discuss how the UN 
sees local ownership as engaging with national government elites, not grassroot level local 
actors.47 This may be because UN staff believe local actors are unable to achieve peace on their 
own and lack the skills to help implement complex reconstructive projects.48 Billerbeck argues 
the negative perceptions of the local within the UN is due to the primacy of the liberal 
peacebuilding agenda where the local is simply given token ownership of a UN-designed 
template.49 The UN-designed template is simply that, UN-designed where the local ‘are not 
empowered to play a role in determining that vision.’50 Similarly, Richmond claims ‘local 
ownership becomes watered down into participation in externalized rather than localized 
processes.’51 Billerbeck’s research shows that local actors feel many decisions which determine 
the overall shape of a UN peace operations are ‘foregone conclusions’ and the UN only pays 
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‘lip service’ to local ideas.52 The below case study sheds some light on where local voices are 
absent in UN reporting which may indicate an absence of the local in decision-making. 
This article agrees with Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Martin in that local agency and 
empowerment is critical but must be filtered down effectively from the strategic level to the 
tactical and operational levels.53 Therefore, a UN peace operation should engage the local to 
determine the full range of local needs and expectations.54 Ownership can also not be achieved 
without building local capacities by engaging and empowering the local.55 In this regard the 
case study on UNOCI in the following section explores how the UN has framed its activities 
in three areas. First, where the local have been given space to be engaged. Second, where the 
local have been given agency and empowered. Finally, where the UN has recognised 
vulnerabilities as a separate set of needs. It must be said that the case study does not purport to 
show the complete picture of how the UN interprets and operationalises local engagement, 
empowerment and ownership. Instead the case study gives a chronological outline of activities 
which can be associated with the local turn. 
 
3 The local turn in UNOCI 
 
3.1 Engaging the local 
 
The local turn argues that external actors must be guided from the bottom-up, not only by top-
down understandings of peacebuilding. Here engaging the local means providing space for 
local people to communicate what they deem to be crucially important for their security, 
building sustainable peace, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. 
Initial discussions at the start of the mission were between Forces armées nationales de 
Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) and Forces nouvelles on ways to reduce checkpoints, and between the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and regional heads of state on 
kickstarting the peace process.56 Since elections were not possible in 2005, consultations were 
held on who should become Prime Minister but the UN does not make it clear in their reporting 
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who made up the Ivorian parties consulted.57 With regards to the needs of local people, the UN 
states that providing basic services and improved security conditions are essential.58 Similarly, 
it is stated that ‘[t]he lack of security continues to affect negatively the living conditions of 
most of the population.’59 However, no further details are forthcoming on whether these local 
needs were communicated from the local, whether they represent what services and security 
issues are most valued by local populations, and how the UN intends to action any issues raised 
by communities. 
 Early examples of where the mission does provide space for the local to communicate 
needs can be seen from 2006 onwards. First, in October 2006 a workshop was held in which 
the government, UNOCI, other UN actors, humanitarian organisations, donors, and civil 
society ‘take stock of the key protection challenges and to agree on action to be taken.’60 The 
inclusion of civil society groups could mean local organisations but could also be only national 
elites and unrepresentative of diverse views of the local, again the UN does not make an express 
distinction. Second, UNOCI established sub-offices in other Ivorian cities, undertook peace 
caravans which visited schools, and held town hall meetings.61 This type of engagement 
certainly provides space for communities to raise the issues most important to them with 
UNOCI but are isolated examples. Third, civil society are included in the technical assessments 
of UNOCI from 2007. Civil society did express concern over the lack of information on the 
Ouagadougou Accords in the countryside and UNOCI was informed that its own troops had 
failed to protect civilians who were under attack.62 This is despite the Ouagadougou Accords 
being described by Charbonneau as a ‘local’ peace accord.63 However, the UN provides limited 
further examples of what local needs and views were communicated by civil society. In the 
2010 technical assessment of the mission, community groups informed UNOCI that a lack of 
social services, water, health care, and education contributed to lost opportunities to enhance 
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social cohesion.64 In response, UNOCI and the UN Country Team prepared a strategic 
framework to re-establish social services but was underfunded in that regard.65 Technical 
assessments of the mission can be used to engage the local where communities and civil society 
are included and prepare appropriate responses to the needs raised. That being said, in the first 
six years of the mission the UN did not frame its activities as prioritising local engagement and 
examples are found scattered in the documentation as opposed to existing under consistent 
headings in the periodic Secretary-General reports, for example. 
 Following the 2010 elections there were several initiatives which provided clearer 
opportunities to engage the local. Under the Ouattara presidency the mission was more capable 
of undertaking its own initiatives and supporting government programmes that provide space 
for local engagement whereas under Gbagbo the mission struggled to move around the country 
and access populations in need. In 2012 UNOCI sought to reinforce ‘its field presence with a 
view to increasing its engagement at the local level.’66 By increasing their presence in the field 
the mission would be able to intensify its engagement with communities and ‘improve the 
effective delivery of mandated activities and programmes.’67 It is suggested here that an 
increased field presence is a major step in the direction of allowing bottom-up action where the 
mission can receive valuable information from local populations and feed those concerns into 
the mission’s activities and programmes. It was later reported that the increased presence would 
enhance the mission’s ability to protect civilians and would allow for conflict prevention and 
mitigation.68 Importantly for engaging the local, the Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative for UNOCI believed this presence would foster ‘more proactive outreach to 
other key actors on the ground.’69 In 2013, the mission explained that there would be local-
level protection of civilian working groups, that cell phones would be distributed to allow rapid 
response to sexual violence, and a call centre would be reactivated ‘so that the population can 
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share its protection concerns with the Mission.’70 The information collected would then be 
relayed to relevant bodies to be actioned upon and help identify areas of concern.71 
 Following the 2010 elections the documentation shows a manifest concern for 
understanding local-level issues. UNOCI proactively sought information by engaging with the 
local populations and put in place mechanisms which allows for communities to inform the 
mission of security concerns and other priority needs. Specifically for achieving the mission’s 
protection of civilians mandate UNOCI supported awareness-raising and early warning 
committees.72 By working with communities on establishing the committees UNOCI was able 
to improve its working relationship with local authorities and more closely monitor security 
developments at a local level ‘to help prevent conflict.’73 What can be seen from the range of 
examples in this section is that it was not made evident by the UN in their framing of the 
discussion on UNOCI that the mission was concerned with hearing local-level issues from the 
beginning of the mandate. Instead the mission evolved and once the priorities shifted to 
supporting national reconciliation under the Ouattara government UNOCI was able to establish 
methods of engaging the local. However, Piccolino reports that government initiatives to 
improve community-level dialogue and cohesion have mixed results with the government’s 
Commission Dialogue, Vérité et Reconciliation (CDVR) regarded as a failure by the 
population.74 
 
3.2 Empowering and giving agency to the local 
 
It is one thing to engage the local and seek their views but it is another to actively support the 
empowerment of the local to increasingly have agency, to have a voice that can be heard, and 
to become active participants in post-conflict reconstruction and national reconciliation efforts, 
which can ultimately lead to ownership of their security. The early stages of UNOCI’s mandate 
focused on the warring parties and priorities were the commencement of the disarmament, 
demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) process, restoration of state authority, 
and, as will be discussed below, the facilitation of credible elections.75 There is no initial 
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mention of UN supported local-level peace initiatives, UN encouragement of local involvement 
in the peace process or national reconciliation until later in the course of the mission. Instead 
of promoting national reconciliation from the bottom-up, UNOCI sought to reintegrate former 
combatants and also disseminated information through the mission’s radio station, UNOCI 
FM.76 UNOCI FM formed collaborations with local radio stations, broadcasted information on 
the electoral process and in one case the mission provided equipment to a community radio 
station.77 Three years after deployment the UN recognised that disputes at the community-level 
are problematic and cause displacement.78 In the years that followed the mission did begin to 
undertake hands-on local peacebuilding activities with a view to empowering the local. 
 In 2006, the aforementioned UNOCI Gender Unit trained women candidates for the 
elections alongside civil society but the empowerment of women was not a key concern of the 
mission until closer to the elections.79 In 2007 civil society requested that the UN do more to 
empower women and in the following year UNOCI assisted the government in preparing an 
action plan on the participation of women in the peace process.80 UNOCI further provided 
support for civil society in promoting the participation of women as both candidates and 
voters.81 Shortly after these activities the Security Council mandated UNOCI to remove 
obstacles and challenges to women’s full participation and involvement in public life.82 
 The overriding focus of the discourse put forward by the UN and the Security Council’s 
mandates were to provide support for elections in general, not only to empower women to take 
part. In 2005 UNOCI’s mandate was altered to include support for free, open and fair elections 
by providing assistance to the government and Independent Electoral Commission where 
necessary.83 In 2007 it was specifically stated the mandate was renewed to provide support for 
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the organisation of elections.84 The SRSG reported that much of UNOCI’s attention was given 
to electoral support in 2008 with activities to further intensify in 2009.85 Briefings delivered on 
UNOCI to the Security Council from 2008-2010 were overwhelmingly focused on elections 
and little information on other issues is conveyed.86 UNOCI therefore very much became a one 
track mission and concerns of the local risked becoming lost.  
The UN not only provided equipment and logistical support but the SRSG was also 
granted the role of certifying every stage of the results.87 As a result of this mandate, when the 
results of the elections were disputed between supporters of Gbagbo and the eventual winner 
President Ouattara, the UN was forced to carry out its certification role and declare a winner.88 
The UN had previously been heavily criticised by a propaganda campaign in Côte d’Ivoire and 
by declaring Ouattara as the rightful President risked causing further divisions and entrenching 
the anti-UN sentiments held by certain groups. In opposition to the idea that the UN acted 
partially by involving itself in the political affairs of Côte d’Ivoire the UN has since been 
critical of the government’s lack of action in pursing the prosecution of its own human rights 
abusers and the perceived targeting of forces loyal to Gbagbo. Criticism remains though with 
Bekoe arguing ‘UNOCI appeared to prioritize the organization of elections over the 
establishment of a conducive environment for those elections to take place.’89 Particularly 
important for how the UN frames its activity is that a former member of the UN’s Group of 
Experts on Côte d'Ivoire reported UNOCI had wanted passages of the Group’s March–
September 2010 report rewritten in an effort to play down any risk to the elections.90 The 
release of the report was delayed until the following year in an effort to ‘suppress information 
of the increasingly deteriorating situation in Côte d’Ivoire.’91 The situation with the Group of 
Expert’s report shows the UN can exert pressure to ensure positive reporting of a mission in 
critical periods of time. Such pressure may mean UN reporting is not an accurate depiction of 
the mission’s activities. It is important though to note how material relating to the elections 
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may be skewed by the UN in favour of portraying a fair and transparent process where the local 
has been engaged. 
 In the lead up to, and especially following the elections, UNOCI began local peace 
initiatives that could promote reconciliation. The mission carried out activities at the 
community-level to strengthen social cohesion, but no specific details are given.92 In addition 
civil society was encouraged to hold events promoting the peace process and UNOCI ‘carried 
out grass-roots advocacy interventions’ to promote peaceful resolution.93 The Secretary-
General supported the expansion of assistance for activities which promote social cohesion and 
national reconciliation.94 Promoting social cohesion and community activities which contribute 
to national reconciliation can encourage communities to take ownership of the peace process, 
identify security issues, and resolve them to the best of their abilities. However, UN reporting 
on these activities is brief and it is difficult to conclude whether the local was given any true 
ownership in the peace process.  
 Reconciliation at national and local levels through the involvement of all Ivorians 
including women and civil society was mandated for by the Security Council in both 2013 and 
2014.95 The UN recognised that community level work was important because a) communities 
had been militarised by the former regime and were former security personnel had returned 
home with weapons after Gbagbo’s arrest and b) violent clashes between communities that 
have access to  a large number of weapons could lead to large-scale conflicts.96 To mitigate the 
risk of escalation UNOCI supported the creation of two types of committees. First, local 
security committees which coordinate security activities at the local level with the involvement 
of local prefects, law enforcement and other officials.97 Second, local early warning and 
sensitization committees were created and include local authorities, politicians, civil society 
and traditional leaders.98 As a result, it was later reported that the early warning committees 
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‘have been instrumental in easing intercommunity tensions and violence’ and by 2015 there 
had been a slight decrease in inter-communal conflict.99 These examples further demonstrate 
that following the 2010 elections there was an effort to show UNOCI as supporting the creation 
of space for local communities to be empowered and have a voice in the peace process. 
 
3.3 Assessing vulnerabilities 
 
Engagement and empowerment of the local must not only include the so-called ‘typical 
subjects’ encompassing national elites and traditional community leaders who may wish to 
pursue goals that contravene the needs of local communities.100 Instead, the external actors 
must engage and empower ‘‘atypical’ local interlocutors including prominently women and 
youth as well as other traditionally marginalised categories, notably internally displaced 
population and minority groups.’101 Richmond identifies that the local should include diversity 
and depth where women, young people, indigenous peoples, displaced groups, and other 
marginalised communities are involved as they may the ideologies and norms brought forward 
by the external actor.102  
A trend visible in the UN reporting on UNOCI is the recognition of vulnerable groups 
who require additional protections or assistance to increase their participation in the 
reconciliation process. Côte d’Ivoire has seen rampant sexual violence against women and girls 
and the use of child soldiers, but the particular vulnerability and consequent specific protection 
of women and children was not included in the first mandate, Resolution 1528. In 2004, child 
soldiers are mentioned as they were used by Forces nouvelles but their vulnerability and 
specific needs are not assessed. However, the UN does on occasion recognise particular 
communities and populations as vulnerable. For instance, quick impact projects were used to 
support HIV/AIDS programmes in ‘vulnerable communities’.103 Similarly, ‘vulnerable 
populations’ are recognised where suffering from lack of medicines, insufficient drinking 
water, food insecurity, and malnutrition.104 
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 The needs of women and children as particularly affected groups were mainstreamed 
into the mandate from 2005 onwards. UNOCI had a Gender Unit which worked on issues of 
vulnerability and on increasing women’s participation in elections.105 Child protection first 
featured as a section of the mission’s reporting in 2005 due to the fact the mission was given a 
child protection advisor to mainstream child protection and identify ‘key vulnerabilities’.106 
Under this heading of child protection UNOCI concluded an agreement with Forces nouvelles 
to stop the use of child soldiers which is reported as the first of its kind in a peace operation.107 
The UN recognises that children are especially affected by conflict and their vulnerability 
increases where they are unable to access education, health care and nutrition.108 In 2007, 
during the technical assessment of the mission, civil society groups asked the UN to pay close 
attention to the needs of women and children associated with the armed groups.109 The resulting 
mandate renewal included the protection of women and children including monitoring and 
reporting on the issue.110 In 2010, the mandate specifically stated that women, children, the 
elderly, disabled persons and displaced person are members of vulnerable groups.111 The 
mission has recognised vulnerabilities which demonstrates  concern for groups which may need 
additional support to be engaged and participate in reconciliation, but it not always clear what 
actions are taken in response to the identification. 
 To specifically respond to vulnerabilities and build future resilience UNOCI focused 
on assisting the vulnerable groups alongside the government by formulating plans of action. 
Some resilience building is left to the humanitarian community, such as where it was said 
humanitarian actors would assist the Ivorian authorities with enhancing access to education 
and employment for youth.112 UNOCI has also worked with the government to create a national 
action plan to combat sexual violence and supported the establishment of a national 
commission for war-affected children.113 Nevertheless, sexual and gender-based violence and 
human rights violations against children continued in the years that followed.114 Though by the 
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time the mission was nearing closure UNOCI recorded the lowest number of violations against 
children between April 2016 and January 2017.115  
The discourse put forward by the UN places strong emphasis on the participation of 
women. In 2015 the SRSG also reported that a National Council for Women had been launched 
to encourage the participation of women in decision-making and politics, however it is not 
reported what role UNOCI played in the creation of the council.116 The SRSG continued to 
note that more and more women were becoming involved in the public sphere and that women 
were becoming involved in social, economic, security and political issues.117 Although the 
number of women in the Ivorian National Assembly decreased in the 2016 elections the SRSG 
stressed that because a significant number of women ran for office that it was a positive step 
for the continued participation of women.118  
 
4 Mainstreaming the local into UN peace operations 
 
The local is a difficult subject to define. Rather than being narrow and focusing only on 
instances where the local have truly been given ownership of the peace process the case study 
above has given a broad range of examples where the discourse created by the UN reports that 
the local have been engaged, empowered or identified as particularly vulnerable. It is clear 
from the study that the UN does recognise the need to engage the local and groups are given 
agency and empowered to have a voice in the peace process, but this only became a more 
regular feature of mission reporting after the 2010 elections and during the Ouattara 
government. This finding partly aligns with Piccolino’s research where, 
‘Ivorians interviewed generally agreed that peace and social cohesion at the 
local level are important and that social cohesion was only partly attained 
with the official end of the crisis in 2011. Tensions and mistrust persisted 
and affected the everyday experience of many Ivorians.’119 
Clearly, the situation improved at the end of the crisis in 2011 but deficiencies still existed with 
the UN unable to effectively resolve local issues even with a more cooperative host state 
government. It must not be brushed over though that the UN’s prioritisation of the 2010 
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elections, and the surrounding examples given above, in the years leading up to Gbagbo’s 
departure directly influenced a focus on national elites and not local peace. 
What this study suggests is that part of the reason why the UN did not resolve the 
persistent tension and mistrust in Côte d’Ivoire is because examples of true ownership are 
absent from the UN reporting. As stated above, Richmond believes ownership indicates choice 
and flexibility over institutional formats. The UN reporting does not show how information 
garnered from the local has been used to inform decision-making. For instance, it is discussed 
how the mission sought to improve its field presence to intensify engagement and improve 
dividends for the local population. However, the UN does not provide any information in its 
reporting on whether the local population have been given agency to decide the direction of 
UN programmes or services being offered and tangible ownership of any local peace processes.  
Civil society have also been mentioned on numerous occasions, but the UN does not 
explain who constitutes civil society making it impossible to determine whether the civil 
society groups represent the local or more traditional national elites. Overall, it is difficult to 
conclude whether more than lip service has been paid to local views when they have indeed 
been engaged with, but the reporting does show the UN wishes to portray a consistent concern 
for the local. By making more detailed and transparent reporting publicly available the UN can 
show local partners that their views and voices are being carried up to the Secretariat and 
Security Council’s decision-making processes. The current situation where it is unclear 
whether consultations provide tangible results may lead to local actors to not prioritise working 
closely with the UN as they cannot impact the direction of a mission. An easily discernible 
commitment to local peace is needed in order for the UN to capitalise on the diverse array of 
local partners able to inform decision-making.  
Some important points to note regarding engaging the local is that host state cooperation 
is needed to facilitate local-level peace initiatives that allow for the engagement and 
empowerment of the local. Initiatives like peace caravans that visit local schools and meetings 
across the country to meet with communities are unworkable where the mission’s movements 
are limited by the host state forces. It was noted above how an increased field presence is a 
major step in the direction of allowing bottom-up action where the mission can receive valuable 
information from local populations and feed those concerns into the mission’s activities and 
programmes but this is only possible with the cooperation of the authorities. Likewise, local 
authorities need to be invested in peacebuilding initiatives at the local level. For instance, the 
UN supported local authorities and law enforcement to be involved with local peace and early 
warning committees in Côte d’Ivoire. Without the engagement of local authorities, it would be 




difficult for solely the UN to implement the requests of the communities. In UNOCI there is 
also less attention given to vulnerability in the first few years of the mandate. The Security 
Council has become much more concerned with the protection of vulnerable persons, such as 
women and children, in the last decade and when UNOCI deployed in 2004 the Security 
Council’s work on the issue was in its infancy. 
What is needed going forward is much clearer UN reporting on its strategies and 
activities in relation to the local. Public UN documentation must show a commitment to the 
local but go further and provide interested parties with a fuller understanding of the local. The 
UN needs to adapt its mission reporting and mandating to show (1) activities which engage, 
give agency to, and empower the local and (2) how information from the local is being used 
and whether it affects decision-making at the operational or strategic-levels. However, other 
missions deployed today suffer from similar flaws found in UNOCI.120 For example, in the UN 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) it is unclear in the 
reporting whether quick impact projects are constructed and carried out by the mission based 
on information from the local.121 Similarly in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 
mission reporting does not always state that mandate renewals have included local 
consultations. In 2015, the review of UNMISS’ mandate did include a “cross-section” of 
stakeholders including displaced persons, women, youth, and civil society but in 2018 it is 
stated there were extensive consultations held with the government, diplomatic community and 
NGOs with no mention of whether local level consultations were held.122 
If instead the UN consistently included a section in its periodic reports that covers 
engagement and empowerment of the local the UN would be able to show future local partners 
that their voices will be impactful by working the mission. The UN could also follow up on 
whether local engagement has provided dividends for the local in any way. The UN will also 
need to be conscious of its focus on elections. On the one hand, the Ouattara government 
provided space for many of the successful local peacebuilding activities that took place in the 
second half of the mission. But on the other hand, a preoccupation with ensuring elections take 
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place, prioritised by the UN Security Council in its mandates, can distract from what is needed 
for local peace. To develop our understanding in this area future research could expound the 
relationship between the pursuit of elections alongside other peacebuilding activities and the 
dynamic that created between the national and the local.  
